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Abstract
It is now widely held that the New Neoclassical Synthesis (NSS) offers central
banks a "user friendly", though rigorous, theoretical framework consistent with
current practice of  systematic stabilization policy based on interest rate rules (e.g.
Woodford (2003)). Particular interest and curiosity have been aroused by
Woodford's argument that the NNS theory of monetary policy is in its essence a
modern restatement and refinement of Wicksell's interest-rate theory of prices
(1898). This paper deals with two main issues prompted by Woodford's Neo-
Wicksellian revival. The first questions the consistency between the NNS and
Wicksell. The second  concerns the value added for monetary policy of Wicksellian
ideas in their own right. Section 2 clarifies some basic theoretical issues underlying
the NNS and its inconsistency with a proper Wicksellian approach, which should
be based on saving-investment imbalances that are precluded by the NNS
theoretical framework. Section 3 presents a proper Neo-Wicksellian dynamic model
whereby it is possible to assess, and hopefully clarify, some basic issues concerning
the macroeconomics of saving-investment imbalances. Section 4  examines
implications for monetary policy, in particular for Taylor rules, and section 5
concludes.
BACK TO WICKSELL?
IN SEARCH OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF
PRACTICAL MONETARY POLICY
	
Over the last fifteen years the theory and practice of monetary
policy (first and foremost in the United States) have been moving along
convergent paths to an unprecedented extent (Blinder (1998), Woodford
(2003), ch.1). Which side is to be credited for the more valiant effort is
open to discussion, but this aspect is of minor importance when compared
with the widespread conviction that reviving the consistency between the
views of academics and policy-makers is a success story with regard to
the ultimate goal of the sound governance of modern market economies.
This convergence process has taken place within, and has been prompted
by, the advent of  what many scholars regard as the newly established
macroeconomic consensus: the so-called ‘New Neoclassical Synthesis’
(NNS)1. The key tenets of the NNS can be summarized as follows.
1) Output and employment fluctuate in response to unexpected
shocks in the determinants of aggregate demand and supply around a
long-period trend  of output ("potential output") corresponding to full use
of factors up to the "natural rate of unemployment".
2) The economic system responds to shocks with variations in
quantities in the short run because of imperfections in the organization
of goods and labour markets or because of disincentives by economic
agents against price changes.
3) "Money matters": a) Monetary policy impulses have persistent
real effects; b) the typical observed pattern is one where policy
interventions (mainly activated by changes in administered rates and
                                           
1 To mention only few: Goodfriend-King (1997), AEA (1997), Clarida et al.
(1999), Blanchard (2000), Woodford (2003).
2money-market rates) are followed by quick and large responses in short-
term interest rates, monetary aggregates, total credit, and different
measures of real economic activity, and by slow and delayed adjustment
of different price indexes; c) real wages and profits are also procyclical
with output after a monetary shock.
4) However, neither fiscal nor monetary interventions on
aggregate demand are able to alter the level of potential output and the
natural rate of unemployment permanently; their only effect would be to
raise the average level of inflation above "core inflation".
5) Economic policy is best managed by means of  "rules": policy
makers should respond to a stable and transparent objective function
such that  fluctuations around potential output and core inflation are
minimized, without tampering with the "natural" combination of
potential output, unemployment and core inflation.
According to Woodford (2003), the NNS now offers central banks a
"user friendly", though rigorous, theoretical framework which a) meets
the current scientific canons (i.e. those of dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) models), b) explains the evidence of real effects of
monetary policy, c) grounds the rationale for macroeconomic stabilization
on welfare analysis, d)  is consistent with the principle of rule-based
policy and allows central banks to assess alternative rules of systematic
stabilization policy.
Research on the foundations, design and implementation of
monetary policy rules is today the most active branch of the NNS (see
also Clarida et al. (1999), Taylor (ed.) (1999)). Driven more by successful
empirical analyses stimulated by Taylor (1993) and by appeal to the
major central banks’ modus operandi than by pure theory, this research
has focused on interest-rate rules. These rules typically take a short-term
interest rate (e.g. the discount rate or the inter-bank overnight rate) as
an instrument and describe (or prescribe) how such an instrument
should be geared to a set of macroeconomic state variables vis-à-vis their
relative target values. To date, Woodford's book offers the most advanced
and systematic theoretical foundations of  interest-rate rules within the
framework of the NNS. His most noteworthy conclusions are
3• interest-rate rules in general ensure determinate macroeconomic
equilibria provided that they embody the so-called "Taylor principle",
namely that the elasticity of the interest rate to excess inflation
should be greater than one
• such macroeconomic equilibria can be ranked according to welfare
criteria, and so too can the specification of the underlying interest-
rate rules
Particular interest and curiosity have been aroused by Woodford's
argument that the NNS theory of monetary policy is in its essence a
modern restatement and refinement of the kernel of Wicksell's theory as,
for instance, set out in his most famous pamphlet Interest and Prices
(1898). This renewed "Wicksell connection"2 is, in Woodford's view,
substantial because (see e.g. pp. 49-55)
• interest-rate rules imply that the instrumental rate is anchored to the
real interest rate that prevails when all macroeconomic state
variables are at their target values (e.g. the intercept in the estimated
Taylor rules): this real interest rate is best understood as Wicksell's
"natural rate of interest", namely the real rate of return to (marginal
product of) capital that equals the consumers' marginal rate of
substitution along the potential output path
• the Taylor principle also implies that excess inflation arises whenever
the instrumental interest rate is below the level consistent with the
natural rate, while curbing excess inflation requires the instrumental
interest rate to be set above the level dictated by the natural rate: this
is precisely the core of Wicksell's theory of inflation and monetary
policy .
The alleged Wicksell connection of the NNS has prompted further
developments in two main directions. The first is concerned with the
consistency of the connection against Wicksell's own theoretical work:
recent examples are  Boianovsky and Trautwein (2004) and Laidler
                                           
2 The reference is to the title of the celebrated paper by Leijonhufvud (1981)
which examined the monetary theories of Keynes and the Keynesians in
relation to the Wicksellian legacy.  As we shall see, this paper is also quite
relevant to the Wicksellian claims of the New Keynesians.
4(2004), who argue that Woodford's theory differs from Wicksell's in
several essential points, so that they see no substantial reason why the
NNS theory of monetary policy should be labelled with the name of the
great Swedish economist. The second direction is less concerned with
exegesis and seeks to assess the value added of Wicksellian ideas in their
own right. In this perspective, Boianowsky and Trautwein subscribe to
the point that modern macro and monetary theory still have a lot to
learn from Wicksell, and from the Swedish school more generally, but
they also stress that the NNS methodological framework of DSGE is
alien to the insights of that older mainstream. Interestingly, but not
surprisingly, this is in essence the same conclusion that Leijonhufvud
(1981) reached in his own assessment of the Wicksell connection at the
time of the Old Synthesis, Monetarism and the then raging New
Classical Macroeconomics.
This paper deals with both lines of investigation. Section 2
clarifies some basic theoretical issues underlying the NNS and its
inconsistency with a proper Wicksellian approach. In fact, the hallmark
of the latter is identified in the problem of saving-investment imbalances
(i.e. intertemporal dis-equilibria, see Leijonhufvud (1981)) which are
precluded by the NNS framework. Section 3 presents a proper "Neo-
Wicksellian" dynamic model whereby it is possible to assess, and
hopefully clarify, some basic issues concerning the macroeconomics of
saving-investment imbalances.  Section 4  examines implications for
monetary policy and section 5 concludes.
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It is apparent that the overall macroeconomic picture provided by
the NNS is akin to the Old one that ruled the discipline in the Fifties and
Sixties. Indeed, the NNS has grown as a branch of the so-called "New
Keynesian Macroeconomics", the research programme launched in the
early Eighties and aimed at micro-refurbishing some resilient building
blocks of the Old Synthesis, such as price rigidity, the sensitivity of
consumption to current income, the investment accelerator, and the
5interest-elasticity of the demand for money (e.g. Greenwald and Stiglitz
(1993)). Thus, to some interpreters (e.g. Blanchard (2000)), the evolution
from the Old to the NNS may be regarded as an instance of technical
progress applied to economic ideas.
It is widely recognized that technical progress has come from the
"New Classical Revolution" of the Seventies and Eighties, culminating in
the methodology of  DSGE based on intertemporally optimizing agents:
this is today the established methodology for macroeconomists of all
persuasions. Moreover, the NNS now has a clear and consistent
counterpart consisting in a Walrasian (New Classical) DSGE. The latter
shows how resources would efficiently be allocated by an ideal
"frictionless" system of markets. Resources for current production and
consumption would be allocated by means of a vector of continuously
market-clearing prices. "Potential output" is the aggregate of these
resources that would result from the Walrasian price vector. In a
simplified economy with homogeneous labour and output, the Walrasian
price vector boils down to the relative price of labour, i.e. the full-
employment real wage rate.  Intertemporal resources would be allocated
by means of a vector of continuously market-clearing capital asset prices.
If one assumes homogenous physical capital as well, this vector collapses
to a single equilibrium real interest rate, i.e. the real rate of return to
(marginal product of) capital that equals the consumers' marginal rate of
intertemporal substitution. Potential output, the full-employment real
wage rate and the equilibrium real interest rate are pinned down by
technology and tastes, and are invariant to changes in the nominal scale
of variables.
On the other hand, the New Classicals went too far in their faith
in the Walrasian representation of  market economies where, apart from
"taking the markets by surprise", no consistent foundations could be
given to the evidence of real effects of monetary policy, nor to the
necessity of monetary policy as a stabilization tool. As was clarified by
Hahn (1977) at the very beginning of the New Classical parable,
Keynes's fundamental contribution was that there exist some critical
6non-Walrasian features in actual market economies3. If not theoretically,
these features have proved hard to ignore empirically. Thus, the New
Keynesians  started  investigating a new class of  DSGE models in which
agents optimize intertemporally in economies with some non-Walrasian
features. Of course, the critical question was: what non-Walrasian
features? From this standpoint, the NNS has focused on non-Walrasian
goods and labour markets, characterized by a) transaction costs, which
give rise to a positive demand for money, and b) imperfect competition
combined with c) other market imperfections that rationalize short-run
nominal wage/price rigidity4. Advocates of the NNS argue that the latter
was in fact the key non-Walrasian assumption in the General Theory,
and far more emphatically, they claim that filtering this assumption
through the new methodology has produced successful business cycle
models and policy prescriptions that outperform Old Keynesian as well
as New Classical ones.
According to Woodford’s (2003) systematization of  the theory of
monetary policy, the NNS microfoundations provide first principles
sufficient to explain why the pace of money demand and supply are
relevant to the determination of real economic activity. In this
framework, non-zero (stock) demand for money (cash) is derived from the
household’s intertemporal optimization as a complement to demand for
the consumption good, while the central bank is the monopolist issuer of
the monetary asset. The household’s optimal consumption plan thus
depends on the entire vector of real interest rates on securities, which
can be altered as the central bank changes the opportunity cost of
holding money vis-à-vis other assets − this relationship is labelled "IS".
Staggered price adjustments under profit maximization implies that
                                           
3 Hahn also warned that not all possibile non-Walrasian features are ipso facto
classifiable as Keynesians. This is an important remark, to which we shall have
to return.
4 Items sub c) are the crucial ingredient in the recipe since imperfect
competition by itself does not lead to nominale wage/price rigidity. They range
from small menu costs, to staggered contracts, to coordination failures. A good
recent survey of these items from this point of view is the one by Van der Ploeg
(2005).
7shifts in the IS schedule, whether due to exogenous real or policy shocks,
give rise to deviations of output (employment) and prices (inflation) from
the respective optimal paths that would prevail with Walrasian markets
− this second relationship is labelled PC (Phillips curve), if referred to the
labour market, or AS (aggregate supply), if referred to the output
market. Finally, the model is closed by an interest-rate rule (IR) that
relates the monetary interest rate to deviations of output and prices from
their Walrasian paths in such a way that the central bank can stabilize
output and prices optimally. This type of three-equations model, with
minor variations, is now the workhorse of much applied monetary
macroeconomics.
As already noted, the shift of focus from the control of monetary
aggregates to the control of monetary interest rates has occurred and has
been justified as a technical evolution in the choice of the instrumental
variables of monetary policy dictated by innovations in financial
markets. After all, the quarrel about the choice between the two types of
instruments dates back far into the past: it was acute in the course of the
Keynesians-Monetarists controversy (e.g. Moore (1988)), and it is
unlikely ever to be settled once and for all. Woodford’s own contribution,
however, goes further.
In the first place, Woodford endeavours to show that there is more
to the choice of interest-rate rules instead of monetary-quantity rules
than sheer historical or technical contingencies. To demonstrate this
contention, he puts forward his Neo-Wicksellian reinterpretation of the
NNS theory of monetary policy on the grounds that Wicksell paved the
way for an "interest-rate theory" of the general price level alternative to
the quantity-theoretical approach.  Thus, drawing on Wicksellian lines,
Woodford elaborates his own model of a  "cashless and frictionless"
economy (ch. 2), the purpose being to show that, even in a world "where
the concepts of money demand and supply become inapplicable" (p. 49),
the central bank can still control the inflation rate by setting the interest
rate on "base money". In this model, base money is a riskless security
that exchanges 1 to 1 units of account in all states in an Arrow-Debreu
economy with complete asset markets where transactions are settled
8without actual currency exchanges by, say, a central computer that
stores individuals' book entries in a common unit . Asset pricing (interest
rates determination) is derived from the representative household’s
intertemporal optimization and the usual no-arbitrage condition. Note
that the model does not preclude the existence of other riskless securities
competing with base money. Nonetheless, Woodford claims that the
model demonstrates that
• the central bank can freely set the nominal interest rate on base
money,
• arbitrage keeps all other market rates (real rates corrected for
expected inflation) aligned with it, and
• given the market real rates, the central bank can thus determine the
general price level of goods by acting as a "manager of expectations"
(e.g. pp. 50-53).
 The key arbitrage condition is nothing but the Fisher's equation,
which for 1 year maturity and zero risk premium Woodford writes as (p.
50)
it = rt + [Etpt+1 − pt]
where it is the nominal interest rate on base money, rt is the real market
interest rate, or Wicksell’s "natural rate of interest", pt is the log of the
general price level and Et is the expectation operator conditional on
information at t. Given pt and it, there is only one path of future expected
prices consistent with the above condition.
Woodford presents this part of his treatment of the NNS as a
thought experiment that, abstracting from the imperfections assumed in
the standard NNS framework, may simplify the analysis of the
foundations of monetary policy and may give logical strength and
generality to the optimality of interest-rate rules (p. 32). Since
Woodford’s "cashless and frictionless" economy apparently has no non-
Walrasian features, at first sight one wonders whether he is taking us
back to a chimerical Walrasian world with money (or, even more
remarkably, without money but with a monetary authority). Indeed, as
shown by Boianovsky and Trautwein (2004), it is hard to find in
Woodford’s model a convincing explanation as to why anybody would
9hold non-zero stocks of base money (which are however forced into the
household’s budget constraint) or any consistent proof of the central
bank’s ability to set an independent interest rate on base money if its
stock happens to be positive5.
Whether or not Woodford’s thought experiment is successful, one
may concede that it is not an essential part of his Neo-Wicksellian
reinterpretation of the NNS theory of monetary policy. Nevertheless, the
problems that surface in the "cashless and frictionless" model can also be
detected in the subsequent parts where transaction costs and staggered
price adjustments are reintroduced (see also Goodhart (2004) and Laidler
(2004)). The problem that concerns me here is not so much the
Wicksellian (un)faithfulness of Woodford’s model as whether a truly
Wicksellian approach may improve our understanding of business cycles
and of the role of monetary policy. To begin with, however, it is necessary
to point out at least the key points on which Woodford differs from
Wicksell.
                                           
5 The basic logical problem raised by Woodford’s model is clear in his arbitrage
equation. Is it expected inflation (in square brackets) that responds to
independent changes in it or the other way round?  Equilibrium asset pricing
implies that all assets in the same risk class should strike the same price
(interest rate) and no issuer can freely set the price (interest rate) of its own
asset. Woodford’s argument that "the special feature of central banks is simply
that they are entities whose liabilities happen to be used to define the unit of
account in a whole range of contracts that other people exchange with one
another" (p. 37) is far from convincing. If a common unit of account is used, say
"euro", then all securities are denominated in euros and promise a certain
(state-contingent) amount of euros that accrue to the holder’s electronic
account.  There is no way in which the central bank’s security can be
distinguished from other equally riskless securities, and hence there is no way
in which the ECB can freely set its own interest rate, forcing the other market
rates to realign by means of arbitrage. Therefore, the only consistent
interpretation of Woodford’s arbitrage condition is that "a central bank can
have no effect on nominal interest rates except insofar as it can shift inflation
expectations" (p. 139). Hence, starting from equilibrium, the ECB would only be
allowed to raise its own interest rate today to the extent that this gives rise to
the (rationally expected)  increase of next year’s price level. But this is "quite
contrary to the original Wicksellian story (not to speak of reality)" (Boianovsky
and Trautwein (2004), p.9).
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1) Wicksell’s interest-rate theory of price determination was
elaborated not with reference to continuous intertemporal equilibrium of
households’ asset stocks but as a development of a number of crucial
aspects of money creation and circulation that were apparently
unaddressed by the then dominant quantity-theoretic equation. In other
words, Wicksell adopted not a stock approach but a flow approach to
monetary analysis (Leijonhufvud (1981), Laidler (2004), Boianovsky and
Tratutwein (2004)).
2) One crucial aspect introduced by Wicksell was bank
intermediation, which is also notably absent from Woodford’s work.
Indeed, in Wicksell’s book the fiction of a cashless economy appears in
the context of a "pure credit economy" (see also Goodhart (2004) and
Laidler (2004)). The ingenious function of the cashless fiction was to
separate the problem of the control of money creation from its role as
physical means of payment. Yet Wicksell’s economy "is not a moneyless
economy" (Laidler (2004), p.3) in that the key problem to be explained
remains how a single agent can have his/her virtual account – i.e. his/her
nominal purchasing power in number of "euros" – increased. Apart, of
course, from selling goods and services, the only other way for an agent
to increase his/her nominal purchasing power is to borrow. Consequently,
the appropriate concept of money demand is the one expressed by
borrowers, whereas the appropriate concept of money supply is the one
expressed by lenders.
3) In Wicksell’s "pure credit economy", borrowers are investing
firms and lenders are saving households, intermediated by banks.  As
long as non-bank agents borrow and lend one with the other, the total
amount of nominal purchasing power in the economy is redistributed but
cannot (need not) increase. The capital market finds its equilibrium at
the natural rate of interest as determined by the "forces of productivity
and thrift" that equate saving and investment at full-employment of
resources. Yet, as soon as the banking system (central bank and private
banks) comes into play, the latter proposition no longer necessarily holds.
A private bank is in a position to grant additional nominal purchasing
power to any of its depositors’ accounts with no one else in the economy
11
undergoing an equivalent reduction. And likewise a private bank can
increase its own nominal purchasing (lending) power by borrowing from
the central bank. Thus, the problem is that the banking system as a
whole might both expand the total nominal purchasing power in the
economy and allocate it at terms that differ from those dictated by full-
employment saving-investment equilibrium.
4) Wicksell’s economy is not a "frictionless economy" at all. First,
there are intermediaries between savers and investors, whose existence
can only be due to some frictions relative to the Walrasian benchmark.
Second, all three actors on the capital market act with limited
information, which may be responsible for deviations of the market
interest rate from the natural rate, as well as for the ensuing dynamics
of money creation, income and prices − the well-known "cumulative
process" (Leijonhufvud (1981), p.160). In this framework, the connection
between money creation and nominal income is necessarily examined in
its out-of-equilibrium dynamics from one level of money and nominal
income to another:
In Wicksell’s theory of the cumulative process, the maladjustment of the
interest rate − the discrepancy between the market and the natural rate − is the
central idea. It is also the idea that motivates the analysis of changes in the
price level (or in nominal income) in terms of saving and investment. It is a
simple but fundamental point. Use of the saving-investment approach to income
fluctuations is predicated on the hypothesis that the interest rate mechanism
fails to coordinate saving and investment decisions appropriately. This is where
all the Wicksell Connection theories differ from Monetarism (Leijonhufvud
(1981), p.132).
Leijonhufvud’s last sentence also applies perfectly to Woodford’s
renewed attempt at a connection with Wicksell. Monetarism was
developed on the grounds of continuous capital-market clearing in terms
of asset stock equilibrium, farther and farther away from Wicksell’s
macroeconomics of saving-investment imbalances6. This line of
theorizing has then been systematized and popularized in the DSGE
                                           
6 Not without the complicity of the liquidity preference theory of the interest
rate and of Keynesians themselves, according to Leijonhufvud.
12
methodology. As explained above, the NNS has fully embraced this
methodology, though introducing the non-Walrasian features able to
breathe new life into the monetary side of these models. Long-standing
doubts and criticisms about whether these features are truly Keynesian,
and  whether they are necessary and sufficient to understand and master
business cycles, are still unresolved (e.g. Van der Ploeg (2005)). Other
scholars of Keynesian inspiration would instead stress the central role of
saving-investment imbalances in the General Theory as well, and would
therefore focus on different non-Walrasian features: in particular, those
impinging upon financial markets and leading to intertemporal
coordination failures (e.g.  Minsky (1975), Leijonhufvud (1981),
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993), Solow and Hahn (1995)). Common to
these views, though different in other methodological respects, is the idea
that the older macroeconomics of saving-investment imbalances does
offers guidance for consistent foundations of the interest-rate theory and
practice of monetary policy precisely because it focuses on the interest
rate as "the wrong price" in the system and lead us to investigate how
the monetary authority can manage to ‘get it right’.
#$%	
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In this section I introduce a simple Neo-Wicksellian model, by
which term I mean a model where,
• there exists a level of the real interest rate, the "natural rate",
whereby the economy rests in a steady state characterized by a given
level of "potential output" and a constant "core inflation rate"
• fluctuations of output and inflation occur as dynamic (out-of-
equilibrium) adjustment processes following nominal or real shocks as
long as the market real interest rate diverges from the natural rate
• the nominal interest rate responds to some measure of the inflation
rate and possibly to other macroeconomic state variables
The steady-state benchmark of the economy in terms of output,
employment and inflation can be traced back to the competitive general-
equilibrium allocations with fully flexible price and full use of resources.
13
Alternatively, the steady state can be characterized by an equilibrium
real wage rate such that a non-zero "natural rate of unemployment"
exists, to which a lower "potential output" corresponds. The difference is
immaterial here. The point is that the price vector along the
intertemporal general-equilibrium path of the economy includes the
relative price of factors (the real wage rate and the natural interest rate),
and the problem is how the economy reacts when the "wrong" price is the
interest rate.
Suppose a shock occurs at time t such that the market real interest
rate exceeds the natural one. Excess saving arises to which there
corresponds excess supply in the goods market at time t, and, by
intertemporal Walras Law, excess (planned) demand at time t+1.
Excesses can only be eliminated by a combination of lower saving/higher
investment at time t and/or lower (than planned) consumption/higher
(than potential) production at time t+1. To this effect, it is required either
a fall in the market real interest rate at time t, or a combination of rise of
inflation/rise of unemployment at time t+17. Note that the capital-market
disequilibrium at time t, if uncorrected, must have an intertemporal
disequilibrium effect on the goods (and labour) market at time t+1 even
though goods prices (and wages) are perfectly "right" with respect to the
natural interest rate. Consequently, as thoroughly explained by
Leijonhufvud (1981), there are, or should be, two key logical implications
of any Wicksellian (and, for that matter, Keynesian) model, namely
• "unemployment will not converge to its natural level unless the
interest rate goes to its natural level − (...) the latter condition will not
always be fulfilled" (p. 135)
• "with the interest rate at the right level, market forces should make
unemployment converge to the natural rate − otherwise not" (p.136)8.
                                           
7 An anticipated rise of inflation at time t+1 is of course a means to reduce the
real interest rate at time t.
8 To put it differently, that the relative price of factors, and the relative
markets, should in some way be interconnected is pure general-equilibrium
theory until Keynes (included). This point apparently fell by the wayside in the
Old Synthesis, and then in modern macroeconomics altogether. Friedman still
made the point (the natural rate of unemployment is the rate observed at the
14
To formalize these propositions, one needs a dynamic model, not in
the current sense of the path of continuous intertemporal equilibrium,
but in the sense that it should track the behaviour of the system out of
equilibrium in the transition from one steady state to another. An
example drawn from the standard IS-AS framework of current
macroeconomics (see e.g. Woodford (2003), ch.4, par. 2.2) is the following.
Let y denote potential output, determined by tastes, technology and the
intertemporal equilibrium price vector; these data identify y as a point on
the IS schedule of the economy. Also let potential output be associated
with the core inflation rate pi and a non-zero rate of unemployment u
(NAIRU). These data identify a point on the (vertical) PC schedule of the
economy. Let then the dynamics around these schedules be described as
follows:
(1) yt+1 = (1 − ρ)y + ρyt − α(it − piet+1 − r)
(2) pit+1 = pi + β(yt+1 − y)
(3) piet+1 = pit+1
Equation (1) describes the dynamics around the IS schedule as the
actual output yt deviates from its potential level y triggered by deviations
of the market real interest rate (it − piet+1) from the natural rate r with
some degree of  persistence ρ. It should be borne in mind that, as
explained above, IS disequilibrium implies that output gaps are
associated with inverse unemployment gaps at the equilibrium price
vector. Equation (2) describes the associated price dynamics around a
vertical Phillips curve pegged to the core inflation rate pi, where
unemployment dynamics is replaced with the corresponding output gaps
to obtain a dynamic AS9. The model is closed by the determination of the
expected inflation rate that enters the real interest rate. In the context of
                                                                                                                          
natural rate of interest) in his "Presidential Address" (1969, p.8), but it
apparently went unnoticed. Thus, as explained by Dixon (1995), modern
macroeconomics is based on ad-hoc assumptions such that the labour market
has been "decomposed" from the rest of the system, notably from the capital
market.
9 Alternatively, equation (2) can be obtained directly via firms' optimal
production plans either under perfect competition and unanticipated inflation
or imperfect competition and staggered price changes.
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this model, the rational expectations hypothesis would imply that agents
know the steady-state values of the variables, which in turn depend on
the inflation expectation itself. This is the notorious self-referentiality
inherent in the rational expectations hypothesis (see e.g. Evans and
Honkapohja (2001)). I introduce a less demanding and problematic
hypothesis, namely "short-run" rational expectations, that is the correct
forecast of one-period-ahead inflation during the adjustment process as
reproduced by equation (3).
 First of all, note that equations (1)-(3) form a system of first order
difference equations. The steady-state values of the vector of the
endogenous variables [yt, pit] are
(4) y  = y
(5) pi = pi
if and only if
(6) i = r+ pi ≡ i
Expression (6) is the "non-accelerating-inflation rate of interest" (NAIRI)
that equals the natural rate plus core inflation. The key point is, as
required, that potential output, the NAIRU and the NAIRI should hold
simultaneously for the system to be in steady state and for the
endogenous variables to take their theoretical values (4)-(5). The point
can be seen in detail on considering the output-gap dynamic equation
obtained from equations (1)-(3), i.e.:
(7) yt+1 − y = ρ'(yt − y) − α'(it − i)
where
αβ−
α
≡α
αβ−
ρ
≡ρ
1
'  ,
1
'
Provided that ρ < (1 − αβ), output settles at y only if (it −  i = 0). I shall
call the latter  the "interest rate gap".
Though simple, this model is able to reproduce the effects of
various types of shocks, namely, real shocks to the NAIRI i (i.e. shocks to
the natural rate of interest), nominal shocks to the market interest rate it,
inflationary shocks to the core inflation rate pi, real supply-side shocks to
potential output y.
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Let us now move to the determination of the nominal interest rate.
As explained above, this should consist in an adjustment equation of the
nominal interest rate it that endogenizes the dynamics of the interest
rate gap after an initial shock. For the sake of comparison, and to
prepare for discussion of monetary policy rules, I first consider three
different specifications inspired by alternative theories of the interest
rate: 1) a Wicksellian bank mechanism, 2) a "dynamic" Keynesian LM
equation, 3)  a "speculative" LM equation. All three specifications relate
to market forces driving the nominal interest rate, with no explicit role
for any monetary authority. I shall then move to monetary policy by
examining different versions of the Taylor rule.
For each specification, I present simulations of the model, mainly
under real and nominal shocks to the NAIRI. All the variables have been
treated as index numbers, and their initial steady state values
normalized to 100. The parameters have been set to the following values:
ρ = 0.1, α = 0.3, β = 0.5
Of course, these values have no particular empirical meaning, but they
portray a system where persistence is low, interest rate gaps have a
moderate effect on output, and output gaps have a limited effect on the
inflation gap or prices are sticky10. These parameters also ensure that,
as long as the interest-rate gap is nil, equation  (7) is stable. In other
words, we do not want the system to be unstable by assumption; rather,
we want to understand under what conditions different interest-rate
adjustment mechanisms contribute to stability or not.
3.1. The Wicksellian bank mechanism.
The well-known Wicksellian idea is that the out-of-equilibrium
nominal interest rate is procyclical with economic activity and the price
level. The explanation is that this process is driven by the need of banks
to keep their accounts balanced during the expansion (contraction) of the
                                           
10 Yet, as is clear from the model's structure, this not the cause of out-of-
equilibrium dynamics. The parameter β only splits the IS fluctuations, induced
by interest-rate gaps, between output and prices.
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demand for funds and of the price level11. As explained in section 2, this
mechanism hinges on a limited informational requirement, in that banks
need not know what the natural rate is at each point in time, which is
consistent with the idea that the nominal interest rate may assume
wrong values12. Conversely, firms do know what the natural rate is, so
that they raise or cut their demand for funds as long as the bank interest
rate is misaligned. Wicksell and his followers also attached great
importance to inflation expectations. Being aware that the system's
steady state should display a constant price level (or inflation rate), the
problem was what inflation rate agents would expect over the
disequilibrium "cumulative process" (see e.g. Leijonhufvud (1981),
Tratuwein and Boianovich (2004)). The first hypothesis to examine is
that agents believe in a "normal" inflation rate to which the economy
tends. Let this belief be pi, consistently with the inflation structural
process (2). Therefore, the resulting representation of the Wicksellian
bank mechanism is the following:
(8) it = it-1 + γ(pit − pi)
that is to say, the nominal interest rate goes on rising (falling) as long as
inflation accelerates (decelerates) with respect to the core rate pi.
On adding this equation to system (1)-(3), the steady-state values
of the endogenous variables are y  = y, i = i, pi = pi.13 As to convergence
and stability of the system, it is interesting to restrict our analysis to
monotonic convergence conditions14. For an interest rate mechanism
associated with oscillations of the system, even though convergent, would
                                           
11 For an abridged version of his theory see e.g. Wicksell (1907).
12 Apparently, the Fisher equation provides an analogous mechanism that may
relate the market interest rate to inflation, but there is an important
underlying difference, which is immediately brought to light by this exercise.
The Fisher equation holds in steady state as shown by expression (6), but we
cannot use it consistently as an out-of-equilibrium mechanism because it would
imply that the market instantly adjusts the market interest rate to the NAIRI
at each point in time. Therefore, there would never be any interest rate gap!
13 All proofs in Appendix
14 A stable system with monotonic convergence requires its characteristic
equation to have all real positive roots smaller than 1.
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neither be interesting nor recommendable. In the present case, for any γ
> 0, the following single condition is sufficient15
(9) βα
ρ−ρ+
<γ
'
'2'1 2/1
This result shows that the Wicksellian mechanism is stabilizing
only within a given range of the sensitivity of the nominal interest rate γ
to inflation dynamics, namely 2.45 with our parameters. The economic
meaning of this condition can be understood by noting that γα'β measures
how much one point of interest-rate gap is self-corrected through the
response γ of the interest rate to the inflation gap  β generated by the
output gap α'. As is intuitive, a stabilizing adjustment mechanism
requires that γ should be smaller, the larger are α' and β. As γ increases,
the system first takes an oscillatory path and then becomes unstable.
Provided that condition (9) holds, despite the NAIRI i is not made
explicit in the interest-rate equation, the nominal interest rate does
converge to that value.
I now report the results of the two typical instances in the
Wicksellian literature: A) a permanent real shock to the NAIRI, B) a
temporary nominal shock to the bank interest rate. The parameter γ has
been set equal to 0.5, which satisfies condition (9).
                                           
15 Proof: see Appendix A1.
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A) Permanent real shock to the NAIRI (r falls up to 10 basis points of
interest rate gap at time 0 and forever (new NAIRI = 90); pi, y held
constant = 100).
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• The shock has transitory effects on output and inflation, owing to the
progressive absorption of  the interest rate gap, and permanent effects
on the nominal interest rate, owing to the fall in the natural rate
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• The system moves to a lower accumulation path, but with no
permanent loss of output 16
• On impact, the nominal interest rate lags behind (does not change)
vis-à-vis the fall in the NAIRI
• In the next period, output starts falling below potential, with inflation
falling below the core level
• The nominal interest rate also starts falling by keeping pace with
deflation
• The system converges to a new steady state where output is back to
potential, inflation is at the core rate, and the nominal interest rate is
reduced to the new NAIRI, given by the lower natural rate plus initial
core inflation
• The AS diagram records a positively sloped plot; observations are due
to transitory dynamics
B) Temporary nominal shock to the bank interest rate (it falls up
to −10 basis points of interest rate gap at time 0; r, pi, y held constant =
100)
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16 A different question is whether along the new accumulation path, the old
potential output remains unchanged as assumed in the exercise. The answer
depends on how the real wage rate adjusts to the lower natural interest rate.
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• The shock has only transitory effects on all the real and nominal
variables (output and inflation raise), owing to the progressive
absorption of  interest rate gap
• The AS diagram shows a positively sloped plot; observations are due
to transitory dynamics.
To sum up. The Wicksellian bank mechanism exemplifies a class of
procyclical market interest-rate processes that progressively absorb the
initial interest rate gap, whether this is due to a real or a nominal shock.
In each instance examined, the interest-rate adjustment is consistent
with the economy’s convergence to the steady state and supports a
determinate rational-expectations equilibrium. This result hinges on the
generalized belief in the core inflation rate pi. To be precise, what the
model actually says is that any belief concerning the core inflation rate
consistently held by all agents is self-fulfilling. On the other hand, it can
be shown (not reported here) that the properties of the system would not
survive when this belief is replaced either with "backward-looking"
specifications (where e.g. pi is replaced by pit-1) or with "extrapolative
expectations" (where e.g. pi is replaced by an increasing function in pit). As
is well known, Wicksell was aware of, and worried about, the
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indeterminacy of the inflation rate over pure credit cycles. And this is, of
course, an important message for monetary policy to which we shall
return. Of less importance, instead, is the hypothesis of short-run
rational expectations, i.e. condition (3). For instance (not reported here),
the system would still converge to the theoretical steady state if, say,
entrepreneurs had static expectations (i.e. piet+1 =  pit+1 is replaced by pit in
equation (1)).
A second conclusion concerns the Keynesian issue of "involuntary
unemployment" over the cycle. As is clear, the Wicksellian bank
mechanism does not lead to excess unemployment (loss of output) in the
steady state (only in the transitory dynamics). Hence, explanations of
involuntary unemployment as a steady-state phenomenon should look for
other mechanisms that prevent the interest rate gap from being closed
(see also Leijonhufvud (1981)). The next candidate is of course the
Keynesian monetary theory of the interest rate.
3.2 Dynamic LM
These exercises have the instructive by-product of making it
immediately clear that the standard specification of the LM equation
cannot be used to address the problem at hand, which is intrinsically
dynamic. Thus the numerous complaints about the "static" nature of the
LM and its misfit with genuinely Keynesian economics seem vindicated.
I have thus devised a "dynamic LM" equation for the nominal
interest rate in the following way. Let us start from the textbook LM
function which represents the interest rate as a function increasing in
current real income and decreasing in real money supply17. If µy and µi
are the income and interest-rate elasticities of money demand, then 1/µi
≡ δ  and µy/µi = µyδ are the elasticities of the interest rate relative to real
                                           
17 The typical LM function is obtained by starting from a log-linear money
demand function,
mdt = µyyt − µiit
Equating money demand to real money supply, mt − pt, the equilibrium interest
rate is
it = (µy/µi)yt − (1/µi)(mt − pt).
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money supply and real income, respectively.  This theory implies that the
interest rate is constant over time as long as real income and real money
supply are constant. Accordingly, a simple dynamic equation consistent
with this theory is the following:
(10) it = it-1 + µyδ(yt − yt-1) − δ(mˆ t − pit)
where mˆ t is the growth rate of money supply.
Also this mechanism has a very limited informational
requirement, being entirely based on step-by-step adjustment to current
observable variables with no need  for public information on the natural
interest rate. There are two main differences with respect to the
Wicksellian bank mechanism. One is the sensitivity to output dynamics,
the other is the dependence on an exogenous dynamic variable − money
supply.
Adding equation (10) to system (1)-(3) and rearranging, the steady-
state values  of the endogenous variables are still y  = y, i = i, pi = pi,
provided that  mˆ t is constant and equal to the core inflation pi. Given mˆ t
= pi, we now have the following condition for  monotonic convergence and
stability:
(11) δ < ρ'/α'µy
The economic message is that the properties of the system now
crucially hinge on the relationship between the  parameters that relate the
dynamics of the nominal interest rate to both inflation and output. In
particular, stability implies an inverse relationship between the two. On
the other hand, the smaller is δ, the smoother is the interest rate
dynamics and the longer is the whole adjustment process.
Let us now examine the same previous shocks as in the
Wicksellian bank mechanism. The parameter µy has been set equal to
0.5. For the sake of comparison, the value of parameter δ has been set
equal to 0.5, like the analogous parameter γ in the Wicksellian
simulation, and in line with condition (11), which in our case is 0.67.
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A) Permanent real shock to the NAIRI (r falls up to 10 points of
interest rate gap at time 0 and forever (new NAIRI = 90); pi, u, and mˆ
held constant = 100)
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• The shock has the same qualitative effects as in the Wicksellian case.
The negative out gap is reabsorbed along with the positive interest rate
gap.
• After the positive interest rate gap at time 0, output falls and
deflation is triggered
• The income and real-balance effects work: they progressively reduce
the nominal interest rate and close the interest rate gap.
• The AS diagram would display the same plot as the analogous
Wicksellian case (see Figure 2)
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B) A temporary monetary shock (mˆ  rises up to –10 points of interest
rate gap at time 0; r, y and pi held constant = 100)
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• The shock has transitory effect on all variables
• On impact, the nominal interest rate falls below the NAIRI and boosts
output
• Thereafter, the increase in inflation reduces real money balances and
drives the  interest rate to its initial steady-state value
• The AS diagram would display the same plot as the analogous
Wicksellian case (see Figure 4).
The most important lesson to be drawn from this exercise is that
even a Keynesian LM interest-rate equation closely reproduces the
results of the Wicksellian one. The inclusion of the output sensitivity of
the interest rate may only change the speed and path of the dynamics of
the endogenous variables unless the relevant parameter is very high, in
which case it may destabilize the system.
From the Keynesian (Old Synthesis) point of view, two are the
most striking implications − which basically amount to the Monetarist
interpretation of the Old Synthesis (see also Leijonhufvud (1981)). The
first is that the Keynesian theory of the interest rate does not seem, per
se, sufficient to explain a steady state with involuntary unemployment.
The economy, as in the Wicksellian view, seems to be endowed with
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reliable self-stabilizing mechanisms (in particular the real balance effect
on money demand) in the cases of both real and nominal business cycles.
The second implication is that, apart from  accelerating and smoothing
the adjustment process,  little scope is left for monetary policy. Its most
important role is instead more Friedmanite than Keynesian. As stressed
in the discussion of the Wicksellian case, the self-stabilizing property of
this economy still relies on the agents' common belief in the core inflation
rate pi, which is in fact realized in the steady state. In this case, however,
this belief  is not arbitrary but can (or should) be anchored to a given
state variable, namely the money growth rate. In fact, the model shows
that the steady-state inflation rate is always equal to the money growth
rate, and hence this provides the only rational belief about the core
inflation18.
Of course, it may be argued that the model assumes a notoriously
critical non-Keynesian feature, namely rational expectations of the entire
path of inflation as implied by the Phillips and the inflation expectation
equations (2) and (3). Yet it can be shown (not reported here) that
replacing these equations  with backward-looking versions (with pit
instead of pi in (2) and instead of pit+1 in (3)) does not change the
qualitative results of the model as long as  the NAIRI is computed at the
"right" steady-state value given by r+ pi, pi = mˆ .
3.3. Speculative LM.
The last alternative determination of the nominal interest rate to
be examined follows from the last sentence in the previous paragraph,
and draws on one among the many criticisms raised against the textbook
LM version of Keynes’s theory of the interest rate. The thrust of this
criticism is that one major element in that theory, the "speculative
motive" of the demand for money, has gone completely astray
(Leijonhufvud (1981)). A truly "speculative" component of money demand
should be related to expected movements of the interest rate relative to its
future value, say is. Speculators substitute bonds for money whenever
                                           
18 The reason is that the adjustment process of it ceases only when pit = mˆ
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they expect capital gains, i.e. a rise in the bonds price or else a fall in the
market interest rate. Therefore, this component should enter the usual
representation of money demand  as a negative function of  (it − is)
(Leijonhufvud (1981), p.146). The dynamic LM should therefore be
rewritten as follows
(12) it = is + µyδ(yt − yt-1) − δ(mˆ t − pit)
This specification implies that as long as real income and real money
supply are constant, speculation keeps the market interest rate aligned
with is.19
Now this determination of the nominal interest rate has a crucial
informational requirement, that is, is. It is clear that the marginal firm
in the bonds market can be expected to pay in real terms no more and no
less than r to investors; hence the benchmark rate for rational
speculators should be the NAIRI. In other words, rational speculators
should have the same inside information as firms about the natural
interest rate. I have simulated two situations vis-à-vis a permanent
change in the natural rate, one where speculators have this information
and one where they do not. The parameters are the same as in the
previous LM model.
                                           
19 Since in equation (12) the fixed exogenous term is replaces the lagged value
of the nominal interest rate it-1, the convergence and stability conditions are
now slightly different than in the plain LM case. In particular, as can been seen
from the simulation below, the same values of the parameters now yield
oscillatory convergence.
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A) A permanent real shock to the NAIRI: full information (r falls
up to 10 basis points of interest rate gap at time 0 and forever (NAIRI =
90); is = NAIRI at time 1 and forever; pi, y, and mˆ  held constant = 100).
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• The shock has the same qualitative effect as the plain dynamic LM.
• The initial impact on the interest rate is larger since it embodies the
lower NAIRI, which is however overshot owing to the concurrent
reduction in money demand exerted by lower output and lower
inflation
• Initial overshooting of the market interest rate generates oscillatory
dynamics.
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B) A permanent real shock to the NAIRI: limited information (r
falls up to 10 basis points of interest rate gap at time 0 and forever (new
NAIRI = 90); is, pi, u, and mˆ  held constant = 100).
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• The shock has permanent effects on both real and nominal variables.
In the steady state, output is below the potential level, the nominal
interest rate is above the NAIRI, and inflation  is below the core rate.
• The AS diagram shows a positively sloped schedule and observations
are due to transitory dynamics towards a lower steady state
This scenario seems to have genuine Keynesian features, in that
"involuntary unemployment" (permanent negative output gap) emerges
because the speculative demand for money prevents the market interest
rate from falling enough to offset the fall in the natural rate. The
fundamental cause is that speculators do not adjust their benchmark
rate to the lower NAIRI. There are however several problems hidden
behind this result:
• the exercise has been run holding the core inflation rate pi constant at
100: yet this expectation turns out to be wrong, because the steady
state inflation will be lower (thus the new steady-state NAIRI is even
lower than after the initial shock since both r and pi have fallen)
• in the new steady state the inflation rate is lower than the money
growth rate (held constant at 100); hence real money balances keep
on growing and create excess purchasing power in the hands of
speculators
• on the other hand, the market interest rate stabilizes at a value lower
than is = 100 expected by speculators, who should therefore keep on
anticipating capital losses in the bonds market, which prevent them
from buying bonds.
It therefore seems that the steadiness of the wrong nominal
interest rate is due not to the absence of forces of change but to two
countervailing out-of-equilibrium wrong forces20. Being fraught with
                                           
20 It is tempting to see here a possibile manifestation of the liquidity trap
(clearly any further increase in the money growth rate would be useless). If this
is the case, it seems necessary to conclude that the liquidity trap cannot be
regarded as an extreme case in the Keynesian pathology but is indeed the
Keynesian pathology! Are therefore Pigou and Modigliani vindicated? Not
exactly. A methodological point in the "Wicksell Connection" applies here,
namely that the pathological states of the system are not due to structural
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expectational errors, however, this scenario can hardly be considered a
genuine steady state. This finding probably frustrates the Keynesians'
search for "involuntary unemployment equilibria"’; but on the other
hand, it is also challenging in that it points out at least one case in
which, in a well-specified sense, a purely market-driven interest rate
may put the system on the wrong track. Moreover, it is difficult to see
where the system can be driven from here, since the corrections of the
underlying errors may prove far from smooth and painless.
(.	
The previous conclusions prompt thoughts on monetary policy as a
visible hand possibly keeping the interest rate on the right track. I have
considered the most popular policy rule on the menu of modern central
banks: the Taylor rule. Interestingly, we shall see that it can be regarded
as a combination of the Wicksellian and the Keynesian interest-rate
models examined above.
The Taylor rule has a variety of specifications which can be
summarized as follows:
(13) it = i* + ϕ(yt − y) + θ( pi~  − pi)
where i* is the benchmark nominal rate, and tpi~  is the informational
inflation rate (the inflation rate used to assess the cyclical position of the
economy).
In empirical versions, the benchmark rate i* is often replaced by
the so-called “interest-smoothing” mechanism, i.e. a gradual adjustment
of the interest rate from the previous period, and current inflation is used
as informational input. Thus, if  we set i* = it−1 and pi~  = pit we obtain an
"adaptive Taylor rule" . In the more theoretically-oriented versions,
usually based on some optimization exercise, i* is nothing other than our
                                                                                                                          
parameters but to particular combinations of events and the way in which they
are processed by markets. In fact, the pathology we have found is not due to
anomalous liquidity preference (the parameter λ is always the same) but to an
informational/expectational error. The implications concerning the relevance of
the problem are quite different.
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NAIRI and tpi~  is the forecast of the inflation rate (in the absence of policy
interventions). The result is often presented as (forecast) inflation
targeting corrected for output smoothing. Substituting i and piet+1|it-1
into equation (13), we obtain a "forward-looking Taylore rule". Let us
examine the two specifications in turn.
4.1. Adaptive Taylor rules
As explained above, an instance of this class of rules is the
following:
(14) it = it-1 + ϕ(yt − y) + θ(pit − pi)
It is immediately evident that this interest-rate mechanism nests
the Wicksellian one (if  ϕ = 0, see equation (8)). In short, this
respecification highlights the key role of the central bank as an
"expectations manager" advocated by Wicksell (see also Woodford (2003),
ch. 1). Here, the anchor of expected inflation is explicitly set by the
central bank, and is given by the target pi itself. On the other hand, it is
also clear that (14) is merely a variation of our plain dynamic LM (10),
once the money growth rate has been replaced by the target inflation rate.
In essence, this reflects the shift from the Friedmanite view of monetary
policy conduct (based on the control of the money growth rate, with the
nominal interest rate as an endogenous variable) to the NNS view (based
on the control of the nominal interest rate, with the money growth rate
as the endogenous variable). Nonetheless, the structural framework is
analogous: that is a dynamic LM-type equation21.
                                           
21 For inexplicable reasons, the belief is growing that the straigthforward use of
the Taylor rule instead of the discredited LM equation in standard AD-AS
macroeconomic models is a major change and improvement, especially for
teaching purposes (e.g. Taylor (2000), Carlin and Soskice (2004)). I think that
my treatment highlights the analogy between a properly dynamized LM and
the Taylor rule. From the policy point of vew, the only “deep” difference between
the two is the usual one between the quantity of money and the interest rate as
instrument. An LM equation like (10) indicates how the central bank should
gear the money growth rate in order to control the capital market interest rate.
The Taylor rule indicates the desired interest rate and assumes as a short-cut
that the central bank can set this rate directly at will. In a more refined
framework, the dynamic LM and the Taylor rule can only be complementary,
since it is hard to see how the central bank can control anything if it is not
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Equation (14) implies that the steady-state solution of the whole
system, y  = y, i = i, pi = pi, exists. As to monotonic convergence and
stability, some qualifications drawn from the LM case are in order. The
first is that the output and inflation gaps parameters cannot be chosen
independently. Instead, they should satisfy a structural relationship
dictated by the system's stability, which in the case of  the adaptive
Taylor rule is
(15) 0 < (ϕ + θβ) < 
'
'2'1 2/1
α
ρ−ρ+
Once this condition is satisfied, the specific advantage of  targeting
y and pi explicitly in the interest-rate equation is that convergence is
faster and smoother than in the Wicksellian and LM processes. If the
central bank does have full information about the (optimal) targets, this
result may provide a rationale for direct interest-rate control by the
central bank.
Note that (ϕ + θβ) is the compound response of the nominal
interest rate to 1 point of output gap, both directly (ϕ) and indirectly via
inflation gap (θβ). The Taylor-rules literature seems unaware that the
two gaps that feed the interest-rate adjustments are, in general,
correlated in relation to the type of shock that hits the economy and the
subsequent dynamic process. From this point of view, the standard
Taylor rule looks like a quasi-reduced form of a structural form that
includes a relationship between inflation and output gaps22. Our system
(1)-(3) is a case in point. Clearly, equation (2) can be used to replace
                                                                                                                          
consistent with money demand and supply (flow) equilibrium. In fact, the true
instrument that the central bank can control directly is the discount rate, which
is in its turn a means to regulate credit creation and hence the money growth
rate. If the Taylor rule, as in its empirical applications, is taken to represent
how the central bank wishes to manage the discount rate, then assuming a
stable relationship between the discount and money growth, the dynamic LM
equation yields the changes in the interest rate consistent with the equilibrium
of money demand and supply.
22 This remark can be traced back to a basic and yet unresolved question:
where does the Taylor rule come from? It is true that some authors have proved
that it can be derived from standard policy optimization. Nonetheless,  the
rationale of a policy rule which apparently treats correlated variables as
independent is far from clear.
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either the output or the inflation gap in equation (14), so that only one of
the two remains. Consider the cases in which the two gaps are positively
correlated: then the mechanical application of the Taylor rule would
imply that the interest rate reacts twice to the same signal. Hence
condition (15) highlights that the system's stability requires that this
compound response be limited upwards.
From this point of view, the scope for the choice of the two policy
parameters is constrained by the system's stability requirement. From
condition (15) we see that, along the stability frontier, if one wants to
raise the sensitivity to inflation gaps θ, the sensitivity to output gaps ϕ
should be reduced, and vice versa. Note, also, that the more prices are
flexible (β is large), the smaller θ should be. This may seem somewhat
paradoxical, but it is perfectly consistent from the mathematical point of
view. In an economy with fully flexible prices, the bulk of adjustments to
interest-rate gaps would take place through changes in the inflation rate.
Large fluctuations in the price level were in fact at the root of Wicksell's
concerns. On the one hand, high aversion to price instability would
generate overreaction to inflation gaps; on the other, the system's
stability indicates that, when prices are flexible, small changes in the
interest rate are sufficient.
A further implication is that the so-called "Taylor principle", that
is the requirement that the inflation-gap parameter θ be greater than 1
(Woodford (2001)), is neither necessary nor sufficient. For particular
combinations of very low persistence (ρ') and/or very high elasticity (α') of
output gaps with respect to interest-rate gaps, θ > 1 might even turn out
to be destabilizing. On the other hand, once the relevant stability
condition is verified, θ < 1 may well be sufficient.
Let us now look at a simulation where the Taylor-rules parameters
are set to ϕ = 0.5, θ = 0.5. These values enable comparison with the
previous cases. Note that the limit value for θ is 1.45 (incidentally ϕ = 0.5
and θ = 1.5 were the values originally estimated by Taylor (1993) for the
United States).
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A) Permanent real shock to the NAIRI (r falls up to 10 points of
interest rate gap at time 0 and forever (new NAIRI = 90); pi, and y held
constant = 100)
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• The adaptive Taylor rule is sufficient to correct for a permanent real
shock to the NAIRI with no permanent effect on output and inflation.
• Convergence displays the same qualitative properties as the market
driven processes (the Wicksellian and the Keynesian), though it is
faster and smoother (this is due to the compound effect of co-
movements in the inflation and output gaps on the interest rate)
Of course, shocks to the interest-rate gap are not the sole concern of
central banks. Given the particular interest of supply-side shocks for
monetary policy, let us examine how the adaptive Taylor rule performs in
this case.
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B) Permanent real shock to potential output (y falls up to 10 points
at time 0 and forever; pi and i held constant = 100)
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• The shock triggers a stagflationary process. The adaptive Taylor rule
is consistent with the system’s converging to a new steady state with
lower potential output, and unchanged inflation and natural interest
rate
• A noteworthy feature of this process is output overshooting. The
magnitude of  the sensitivity to inflation gaps θ determines the first
response of  the interest rate to the initial inflation spike. To the
extent that the interest rate is immediately raised, the inflation gap is
damped, whereas output overshoots with respect to the new steady
state value.
• The inflation-output trade-off embedded in the policy rule concerns,
not the steady-state values, but the variability trade-off of output and
inflation (Taylor and Solow (1998)).
4.2. Optimizing Taylor rules
Specific consideration should be made of the Neo-Wicksellian
prescription that the Taylor rule should be pegged to the natural rate of
interest (Woodford (2003)), that is, i* = i in our formulation.  Another
theoretically-oriented sophistication of the Taylor rule consists in the so-
called "forecast targeting" (Svensson (1997)). This is a specification
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where the inflation gap is measured with reference, not to the current
inflation rate, but to its forecast (in the absence of policy intervention).
The formulation of a forward-looking Taylor rule is therefore,
(16) it = i + ϕ(yt − y) + θ(piet+1|it-1 − pi)
Generally, these reformulations of the Taylor rule are also grafted
onto an explicit optimal-control problem of the central bank (see e.g.
Clarida et al. (1999), Woodford (2003), ch. 8). This is in fact also the case
with our model, where equation (16) can obtained from the following
optimal-control problem23
(17) max Lt = − ]))()[(2
1 22
∞
pi−piσ+−
t
tttt yy
s.t. (pit − pi) = β(yt − y)
where σ measures the degree of inflation (variability) aversion. The most
important implication of  optimization is that the parameters of the
Taylor rule are no longer arbitrary, but are determined by the structural
parameters of the model, i.e.
ϕ = ρ'/α',    θ = σβ/α'
Whereas a generic specification like (16) produces no major
qualitative differences with respect to the adaptive one concerning
existence and convergence towards the steady state, the specification
with the optimizing parameters has the noteworthy consequence that, for
any σ > 0, the system loses monotonic convergence. The system retains
stability provided that
(18) σ < 2)'21(
1
βρ+
Once again, the degree of inflation aversion of the central banker
cannot be merely a matter of taste, but should be consistent with the
requirement of system stability.
Some features of the adjustment process can be appreciated by
looking at the simulation of our usual shock, where σ = 1.5 (i.e. inflation
variability weighs 50% more than output variability) and the maximum
                                           
23 See Appendix A.3.
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value of σ for stability is 3.2. Note that σ = 1.5 generates θ = 2.1 in the
Taylor rule, which is in fact a relatively large value.
A) Permanent real shock to the NAIRI (r falls up to 10 points of
interest rate gap at time 0 and forever (new NAIRI = 90); pi, and y held
constant = 100)
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As explained above, the optimizing, forward-looking components of
the Taylor rule accelerate the adjustment process, but they also
introduce oscillations. In other words, an optimizing, forward-looking
Taylor rule requires more stringent conditions on the magnitude of the
parameters in order to ensure monotonic convergence.
A second important observation is that a Taylor rule pegged to the
NAIRI is analogous to our speculative LM function, when speculators
know the right NAIRI, with the exogenous money growth rate mˆ
replaced by the target inflation rate pi. In fact,  mˆ  and pi play the same
role indicating what the core inflation should be for the central bank.
Indeed, the same conclusion applies: namely, that targeting the NAIRI
directly may be dangerous when it is not known with certainty. In a
recent study published by the ECB, one reads that
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from the empirical point of view, the "natural" real interest rate is
unobservable. The estimation of the natural real interest rate is not
straightforward and is associated with a very high degree of uncertainty
(Garnier and Wihelmsen (2005), p.6).
If the central bank has complete and immediate information about
the NAIRI, then it can and should immediately adjust the nominal
interest rate to offset any change in the NAIRI as it arises (in our
simulation, the new NAIRI is introduced in the rule one period later). If
the central bank does not have this information, and it happens to peg
the nominal interest rate to the wrong NAIRI, then  the Taylor rule
would drive the system towards a permanent output gap, like the
speculative LM function with limited information.
)0
	

Let me summarize the main findings of this exploration of the
Wicksellian lessons for modern macroeconomics and monetary policy
conduct.
First, the main distinction of the original Wicksellian theory with
respect to the DSGE framework of the NNS can be seen in the focus on
disequilibrium business cycles. This type of cycles are driven by "interest
rate gaps" between the market interest rate and the NAIRI and by
saving-investment imbalances. Nominal wage-price stickiness is not the
only problem, wage-price flexibility is not the only solution (in fact,
Wicksell's concern with this type of cycles was not related to any role of
wage-price stickiness).
Second, these cycles are benign as long as the system has a
"nominal anchor" (a given core inflation rate in which agents have
reason to believe), and the market interest rate is driven to close the gaps
with the NAIRI. These conditions are probably more robust than
Keynesians (and Keynes?) believe(d), and the mere existence of the
interest elasticity of money demand is not an impediment. Nonetheless,
this class of cycles remains relevant to the extent that interest rate gaps
are frequent, substantial and persistent; even when long-run dynamics is
40
benign, frequency, amplitude and persistence of these cycles may make
them problematic enough in the short to medium run. A minimal list of
requirements for relevance (and concern) is that the NAIRI should be
volatile and that it should not be easily transmitted to the capital
market;  since the NAIRI consists of the natural rate and core inflation,
these requirements should apply to both components, or at least to one.
Looking at monetary policy, two main conclusions can be drawn.
First, providing the economy with the nominal anchor of expectations
mentioned above emerges as the central bank’s key task. On the other
hand, in this setup the real normative content of the central bank’s rule-
based behaviour is no longer clear. More in particular, the simulations
show that:
• the critical elements that eventually determine whether a rule is good
or bad are not parameters but two crucial pieces of information, the
NAIRU and the NAIRI: no rule produces good results if the central
bank is misinformed about these variables
• if informational problems with a volatile NAIRI are the crux, interest-
rate mechanisms relying upon timely and precise knowledge of the
NAIRI are inapplicable in that they simply rule the problem away;
simulations have also shown that these mechanisms are destabilizing
if they embody the wrong NAIRI
• thus, unless we can be highly confident that central banks are better
(perfectly) informed than the market about the natural rate of
interest, "adaptive" rules, using step-by-step adjustments of the
interest rate vis-à-vis observable conditions in the economy are
preferable in that they produce adjustment paths which are generally
slower, but safer
• more generally, the more detailed and information-laden is the rule,
the broader the scope of cases in which a change in the reaction
function would be beneficial, and the greater the damage that the rule
can produce if the information requirements are not met; the oft-heard
recommendation that central banks adopt and declare reaction
functions with stable parameters is far-fetched
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• the choice of parameters also needs careful scrutiny: the emphasis
placed by current analyses on optimizing Taylor rules in the DSGE
framework may overlook the requirements of  (possibly monotonic)
convergence and stability in the course of out-of-equilibrium
dynamics.
What now remains of the dramatic distinction between "rules" and
"discretion" is an open (perhaps semantic) question.
Further "complications" that may arise from other perspectives are
the following:
• In developed countries with relatively stable and predictable inflation,
the principal source of potential trouble remains the natural interest
rate; and in this respect asymmetric information, heterogeneity of
firms, and other capital market imperfections may have a role to
play24. A somewhat more radical perspective would add behavioural
finance as a repertoire of causes for the mispricing of firms'
investments.
• New Keynesians à la Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) would also add
that potential output (the NAIRU) is not independent of the level of
the NAIRI; or better, they would add that it is co-determined by
capital market imperfections that keep the natural rate of interest too
high or the funding of firms too low.
• Neo-Hicksians (e.g. Amendola and Gaffard (1998)) stress that
"technological shocks" (possibly underlying the volatility of the
NAIRI) are as such non existent (e.g. they remain ideas in the mind of
entrepreneurs) until they are "validated" by financial means; in this
perspective, changes in the NAIRI are not independent of monetary
policy and the market interest rate.
                                           
24 Are Neo-Ricardian problems with the MEC completely out of play?
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This Appendix contains the analytical solutions of the various
systems of linear dynamic equations used in the main text. Let us start
with the initial structural model, which is reproduced here for
convenience:
(A1) yt+1 = (1 − ρ)y + ρyt − α(it − piet+1 − r)
(A2) pit+1 = pi + β(yt+1 − y)
(A3) piet+1 = pit+1
The model is closed by an additional linear dynamic equation for
the nominal interest rate it. Presented below is the system's solution for
each specification of this equation treated in the text.
A.1. The Wicksellian bank mechanism
In this pargraph I first introduce the general solution method used
in all subsequent cases. Let us consider the following equation for the
nominal interest rate:
(A4) it = it-1 + γ(pit − pi)
Addition of this interest-rate equation to system (1)-(3) and
algebraic substitutions yield a two-equations homogeneous system in the
"gaps" gyt+1≡  yt+1 − y, git+1≡ it+1 − i. In matrix form:
(A5) gt+1 = Agt
where g't ≡ [gyt, git], A is the following coefficient matrix:
(A6) A = 





γβα−γβρ
α−ρ
'1'
''
and
αβ−
α
≡α
αβ−
ρ
≡ρ
1
'  ,
1
'
Given the non-zero matrix (I − A)-1, system (A6) has steady-state
solutions g = 0, i.e. y  = y, i = i ≡ r+ pi, which imply, pi = pi
Matrix A can then be used to examine the convergence and
stability properties of the system. For economic reasons, we want to
study conditions of monotonic stability. This reqires the characteristic
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equation of matrix A to have two positive real roots smaller than 1. The
characteristic equation is given by
det(A − kI) =0
k2 − (1+ ρ' − γβα')k + ρ' = 0
Let us refer to the canonical quadratic equation
k2 + bk + c = 0
The condition for real roots is
b2 − 4c > 0
which is satisfied for
(A7) βα
ρ−ρ+
<γ
'
'2'1 2/1
Since (A7) implies b < 0, given that c > 0, the roots are positive.
Moreover, any γ > 0 ensures that the largest root is smaller than 1 (b > −
(1 + c)). Therefore, (A7) is necessary and sufficient for monotonic
convergence and stability of system (A5).
A.2. Dynamic LM
Let us now consider the following interest-rate equation
(A8) it = i
~  + µyδ(yt − yt-1) − δ(mˆ t − pit)
where i~  admits of two specifications: a) it-1 , b) is
Under specification a), addition of equation (A8) to the structural
system (A1)-(A3) introduces one dynamic exogenous variable, mˆ t, so that
the reduced- form system in "gaps" is
(A9) gt+1 = Agt + b(mˆ t − pi)
Therefore, a necessary condition for the steady-state solution g = 0 is  mˆ t
= pi. The coefficient matrix A of the system is
(A10) 





µ+βδα−µρ−−βρδ
α−ρ
)('1))'1('(
''
yy
with characteristic equation
(A11) k2  −(1 + ρ' − α'δ(β + µy)k + (ρ' − α'δµy)
The condition for real roots is
(1 + ρ' − α'δ(β + µy))2 − 4(ρ' − α'δµy) > 0
and, given ρ' < 1, it is always satisfied for any posivite δ, µy. Then the
system has two positive roots smaller than 1 provided that
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1 + ρ' − α'δ(β + µy) > 0
ρ' − α'δµy > 0
1 + ρ' − α'δ(β + µy) > 1 + ρ' − α'δµy
Given that β > 0, the third condition is always verified. Since the second
condition implies the first, it is sufficient that
(A12) δ < ρ'/α'µy
Specification b), i~ = is, introduces the additional exogenous fixed
variable is, so that,
(A13) gt+1 = Agt + Bxt
with x't = [(mˆ t − pi), (is − i)]. Therefore we now have two necessary
conditions for the steady-state solution g = 0, namely  mˆ t = pi,  is = i.
Given these conditions, the stability and convergence conditions remain
unchanged.
A.3. Taylor rules
Let us begin with "adaptive" Taylor rules, whose typical format is
(A14) it = it-1 + ϕ(yt − y) + θ(pit − pi)
This interest-rate equation combined with the structural system
(A1)-(A3) generates a reduced-form system in "gaps" of the same type as
(A5), which therefore admits the steady-state solution g = 0. The
characteristic equation of the coefficient matrix A in this case is
(A15) k2 − (1 + ρ' − α'(θβ + ϕ))k + ρ'
The condition for real roots is
(1 + ρ' − α'(θβ + ϕ))2 − 4ρ' > 0
and is satisfied for
(A16) (ϕ + θβ) < 
'
'2'1 2/1
α
ρ−ρ+
Given that  ϕ + θβ > 0, (A16) also implies that the first-order coefficient
in the characteristic equation is positive. Since ρ' > 0, we have
necessarily positive roots. Finally, it is also always true that
− (1 + ρ' − α'(θβ + ϕ)) > −(1 + ρ')
so that the roots are smaller than 1. Therefore, condition (A16) ensures
stability and monotonic convergence.
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The "forward-looking" type of rule considered in text has the
following specification:
(A17) it = i + ϕ(yt − y) + θ(piet+1|it-1 − pi)
where piet+1|it-1 indicates the inflation forecast for time t+1, elaborated at
time t, conditional upon not intervening on the nominal interest rate set
at time t−1.
In the first place, it can be shown that this specification is
consistent with the standard representation of the central bank's
optimal-control problem, which in terms of "gaps" is given by
(A18) max Lt = −
∞
piσ+
t
tyt gg )(2
1 22
s.t. gpit = βgyt
where σ measures the extent of inflation aversion.
Following the same procedure as Clarida et al. (1999), the first
order condition for a maximum at any point in time yields the optimal
relationship between the output and inflation gaps, i.e.
 gyt = −σβgpit
Substituting this expression into the structural equation for output (A1),
and solving for it, we obtain exactly equation (A17), where, however, the
parameters are no longer arbitrary but should correspond to
ϕ = ρ'/α',    θ = σβ/α'
We can now examine the dynamic properties of the overall system
with a "forward-looking" Taylor rule as specified above. The
characteristic equation of the system is now
k2 + (1 + ρ')β2σk − β2ρ'σ
For any σ > 0, β2ρ'σ > 0, the equation has two real roots, one of which,
however, is necessarily negative. Consequently, monotonic convergence
cannot be achieved. Stability requires the two roots to be smaller than 1
in absolute value; this condition constrains the parameter of inflation
aversion in the following boundaries
− 1/β2 < σ < 2)'21(
1
βρ+
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